We are not always conscious of the ways in which the distinctions we draw . . . will implicate group identities and single out specific groups for distinctive treatment. This is because the constellations of factors or characteristics that go into the construction of identities often masquerade as unconnected, purely individual traits, behaviours, choices, or situations. Yet, in social reality they may be tightly linked to one group or another. So the law has had to recognize that state action may be discriminatory even though on its face and in terms of the intentions informing it there is no obvious evidence that such discrimination is occurring. [p. 258]-Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971

 

Griggs explains that the application of “neutral” rules may not produce equality in substance for disadvantaged groups. Membership in such groups often brings with it a unique constellation of physical, economic and social barriers. Laws which distribute benefits or burdens without accounting for those differences — without accounting for the “posture and condition of the job seeker”, as in Griggs — are the prime targets of indirect discrimination claims. I agree with Profs. Lisa Philipps and Margot Young that

We are not always conscious of the ways in which the distinctions we draw . . . will implicate group identities and single out specific groups for distinctive treatment. This is because the constellations of factors or characteristics that go into the construction of identities often masquerade as unconnected, purely individual traits, behaviours, choices, or situations. Yet, in social reality they may be tightly linked to one group or another. So the law has had to recognize that state action may be discriminatory even though on its face and in terms of the intentions informing it there is no obvious evidence that such discrimination is occurring. [p. 258]-Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971

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In the Otario scheme, there is certain, evident discrimination taking place. 

The problem is legislative evidence except many people can confirm their experience with affidavit evidence including  government  benefit policy  and T5 statements confirming $49000 to 51000.00 per year as transgender individuals and that they do actually receive a benefit with or without application from 12 years old.   It is our intention that every citizen will receive the equal benefit, every citizen like all other provinces,  and that the current provision is made available to some citizens or others certainly by an order of the government under the ODSP ACT 1997 possibly under s.6.  that provides for exceptional circumstances but not to all citizens with or without disability.    This may be adverse impact discrimination.  Adverse impact discrimination, as noted below,  has been a “central trend in the development of discrimination law.

Please see  Fraser v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 (CanLII) and the following excerpt:  

       How adverse impact or systemic discrimination is applied has received extensive academic consideration (see, for example, Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in Canada (2010), at pp. 19‑21; Evelyn Braun, “Adverse Effect Discrimination: Proving the Prima Facie Case” (2005), 11 Rev. Const. Stud. 119; Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Jennifer Koshan, “Adverse Impact: The Supreme Court’s Approach to Adverse Effects Discrimination under Section 15 of the Charter”(2015), 19 Rev. Const. Stud. 191; Michèle Rivet and Anne‑Marie Santorineos, “Juger à l’ère des droits fondamentaux” (2012), 42 R.D.U.S. 363, at p. 374; Diane L. Demers, “La discrimination systémique: variation sur un concept unique” (1993), 8 C.J.L.S. 83; Lisa Philipps and Margot Young, “Sex, Tax and the Charter: A Review of Thibaudeau v. Canada” (1995), 2 Rev. Const. Stud. 221). As Prof. Colleen Sheppard notes:

Why is it so critical to expand on our understanding of adverse effect discrimination? If we do not, there is a significant risk that discrimination embedded in apparently neutral institutional policies, rules, or procedures will not be recognized as discriminatory. This risk is accentuated by the necessity in anti‑discrimination law to connect the experience of exclusion, harm, prejudice, or disadvantage to a recognized ground of discrimination. . . . We need a sophisticated and coherent theory of adverse effect discrimination to assist claimants, lawyers, and adjudicators with the complexities of the manifestations of systemic discrimination.